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Does Market Competition Dampen Environmental Performance?  
Evidence from China 
 
Research summary: Departing from the extant literature which assumes that firms pursue 
strong environmental performance as a differentiation strategy, we analyse the general 
relationship between firms’ competitive strategy and their response to heightened market 
competition. We find that, using a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms between 2000 
and 2005, intensified market competition has an overall negative impact on firms’ environmental 
performance. The negative impact is exacerbated in firms adopting a cost-leadership strategy, but 
attenuated in those adopting a differentiation strategy. The results emphasize the importance of 
including an examination of the particular competitive strategies chosen by firms in seeking to 
understand the impact of intensified market competition.  
 
Managerial summary: Advocates of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have long argued for 
the differentiation role of CSR. However, managers may be misguided if the assumed benefits of 
differentiation critically depend on certain presumptions. In the China’s context and focusing on 
the environmental dimension of CSR, our study finds a negative relationship between market 
competition and corporate environmental performance. It suggests that firms to a large extent 
can’t escape competition via environmental differentiation. Managers should therefore be careful 
of the dimension of CSR as a viable competitive device for firms to employ. 
 
Key words: Market competition, environmental performance, China, corporate social 
responsibility, cost leadership, differentiation, market concentration.  
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Does Market Competition Dampen Environmental Performance? 
Evidence from China 
  
Introduction 
Corporate environmental performance has been the focus of an increasing number of 
academic studies in recent decades. The literature has evolved through several distinct periods 
(Marcus and Fremeth, 2009), from creating awareness, exploring ethical mandates and moral 
responsibility (e.g., Levitt, 1958; Donaldson and Davis, 1991), building a business case for 
sustainability (e.g., Porter and van der Linde, 1995), to explicitly questioning the financial returns 
of environmentally responsible business practices (e.g., Russo and Fouts, 1997; King and Lenox, 
2002).  In this study, we seek to contribute to the literature by probing the relationship between 
market competition and firms’ environmental performance. We are motivated by the current 
literature which predominantly views firm social or environmental performance as a type of 
product ‘differentiation’ device, analogous to a specific type of product innovation, because it 
gives the product an additional ‘attribute’ attractive to some segments of the market (e.g., Bagnoli 
and Watts, 2003; Conrad, 2005; Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2006). But the relationship between 
intensified competition and environmental performance, following this theoretical framework, is 
far from certain. 
It has long been recognized that differentiation is not the only strategy that firms deploy to 
establish a competitive advantage in the marketplace; cost leadership is one well studied and 
documented alternative (e.g., Porter, 1980). The reaction of a firm that has chosen a cost-
leadership strategy to an increase in industry competition may be very different from that of a 
firm that has chosen a differentiation strategy. This is the key argument that distinguishes our 
study from the extant literature. 
Empirically, we use longitudinal Chinese firm level data from 2000 to 2005, and exploit the 
exogenous variations in industry competition stemming from a quasi-natural experiment to test 
our hypotheses: China’s WTO accession in 2001. The event coupled with the firm-level 
longitudinal data enable us to apply a difference-in-difference approach to infer the relationship 
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between market competition and environmental performance. Our indicator of environmental 
performance also improves upon previous studies: we utilize the World Bank ‘Green Watch’ 
data, a comprehensive rating system that includes multiple performance indicators, such as 
hazardous waste disposal, solid waste recycling, pollution accidents, and public complaints, to 
yield an unambiguous measure of firms’ environmental ratings (see Appendix 1). It enables us 
not only to understand how the multiple indicators collectively contribute to the rating of the 
firm, but also to differentiate between basic regulatory compliance and voluntary over-
compliance.  
We find that the exogenous competitive shock stemming from China’s accession to WTO 
dampens firms’ environmental performance in our sample. The negative effect is exacerbated in 
firms adopting a cost-leadership strategy, but attenuated in those adopting a differentiation 
strategy. Our empirical evidence thus suggests the importance of relaxing the assumption 
prevailing in the current literature that all firms adopt social-performance-based ‘differentiation’. 
Instead, it is important to consider firm heterogeneities, such as firms’ strategic position and the 
overall industrial and institutional context in which the way they compete with each other might 
differ.  This then allows us to have a more generalized discussion of the relationship between 
firms’ competitive strategy and their social performance, and to explain why in some industrial 
contexts intensified competition may not foster but can rather dampen firms’ social performance. 
Although our findings are drawn on Chinese data in the early 2000s, where the specific 
institutional and historical context certainly shapes what we can find, it is the differences of our 
findings from others in the literature that provide us with an avenue to seek deeper 
understanding on the complex relationship between market competition, the social and 
institutional environment, and corporate social strategies.  
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In the next section, we review the CSR 
literature, proceeding from studies that view CSR as an aggregate concept to those that focus on 
environmental performance.  This is followed by a discussion of the prevailing view of CSR as a 
differentiation device, which leads to our critique and hypothesis development. We then present 
our research setting, describe our data, and outline our identification strategy before presenting 
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the empirical evidence. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of our research and discuss future 
research directions.  
 
Literature Review 
CSR as a differentiation device 
Dorobantu, Kaul, and Zelner (2017) connect CSR with the nonmarket strategy research. In 
their view, CSR not only represents a way to ‘‘do good’’ (while possibly doing well), but also is 
mainly a strategy through which firms realize the value of their externalities by establishing and 
voluntarily committing to a new set of local institutional structures, with the expectation that they 
will be rewarded for such activities by stakeholders who find it in their own best interest to 
incentivize the firm to continue its CSR activities. Similarly, Kaul and Luo (2017) build an 
economic model of CSR. They suggest that firms with weak competitive advantage in their core 
business are more likely to pursue corporate philanthropy, outsourcing the provision of the social 
good to a non-profit and realizing both modest profits and limited social benefit. In contrast, 
firms with strong competitive advantage in their core business are more likely to undertake in-
house CSR activities, and to realize substantial additional profit from doing so, though the social 
benefit of their CSR activities is more ambiguous. Zhang, Wang, and Zhou (2017) focus on the 
reaction to CSR by securities analysts, and argue that new firms may seek to behave in 
“conformity” with the standard CSR practices of their industry, while firms later in their life 
cycles may seek to deviate to a degree from standard industry CSR practices in order to 
differentiate themselves for the same audience. 
While the above studies inspire us to deeply think and compare the dimensions of CSR, they 
also remind us of a very relevant question from a “strategy’’ point of view (Zhang, Wang, and 
Zhou, 2017). It is a fundamental question faced by all firms: which strategy should they select, 
differentiation or cost leadership? Recent studies have provided evidence supporting the view 
that CSR can be a differentiation device. For example, Flammer (2015) finds that responding to 
enhanced import competition, US listed firms increase their engagement in CSR to differentiate 
themselves from their foreign rivals. In a similar vein, Flammer (2017) also finds that in the U.S. 
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Business-to-Government context, companies with higher CSR win more government 
procurement contracts than their peers with lower CSR.  
Will firms generally increase their CSR when facing tougher competition in order to “escape’’ 
from competition? Two more studies provide affirmative answers (Fernández-Kranz and Santaló, 
2010; Hawn and Kang, 2015). Both use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy for 
market competition and CSR data from Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics 
(KLD).1 However, two other studies fail to find such a relationship using the same datasets. 
Declerck and M'Zali (2012) find that although competition has a positive relationship with 
shareholder and employee-related social actions, it has no such relationship with actions affecting 
other stakeholders. Fisman, Heal, and Nair (2006) focus only on one particular component of 
CSR, corporate philanthropy, because it is considered more aligned with the ‘public’ nature of 
social performance, and find that competition is not statistically associated with corporate 
philanthropy. Collectively, the mixed evidence of the relationship between competition and CSR 
is intriguing. It motivates a call for a deeper understanding of the institutional context and drivers 
of CSR. 
 
Institutional context and drivers of CSR 
According to Matten and Moon (2008), implicit CSR consists of values, norms, and rules that 
result in mandatory and customary requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues 
and that define proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms. 
Hence, such CSR activities appear as a social phenomenon and do not exist independent of the 
firms’ institutional context (Wang, et al., 2016). Similarly, Campbell (2007) argues that ‘’socially 
responsible corporate behaviour may mean different things in different places to different people 
and at different times’’. In this regard, two strands of research seem particularly relevant. 
                                                          
1 These studies share a common issue: they all use as their measure of competition the HHI based on 
Compustat data, which contains a sampling bias due to the listed status of these firms (Ali, et al., 2008). 
Moreover, using the HHI as a proxy for market competition raises the question of its endogeneity to firm 
strategies. Flammer (2015) addresses this methodological issue by exploiting U.S. import tariff reductions 
between 1992 and 1998 as a source of exogenous shock in competitive pressure for U.S. firms, and finds 
support for a causal positive relationship between competition and firms’ CSR. 
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The first strand of research pays increasing attention to the differences between developed 
countries and developing ones (emerging markets/transitional economies/less developed ones, 
etc.). For example, Marano, Tashman and Kostova (2017) find that developing country 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) use CSR reporting to overcome the institutional voids in their 
home country to overcome the liability of origin perceived in their overseas operation. By contrast, 
Ghoul, Guedhami, and Kim (2017) find that the value of CSR is greater in host developing 
countries with weaker market institutions and suggest that foreign MNEs can compensate for 
institutional voids via CSR.  
The second strand of research emphasizes that national level institutions matter for corporate 
social performance. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that in countries where laws 
and regulations promote higher levels of competition, corporations will score lower on the 
corporate social performance index. They argue that given high levels of competition, firms are 
faced with razor-thin profit margins, to the extent that their very survival may be put at risk. 
Therefore, they believe social performance will be lower for two reasons. First, firms with 
minimal or zero profits have fewer, if any, resources to invest in activities that would increase 
CSR. Second, firms in highly competitive environments would be more likely to cut corners and 
attempt to save money whenever and however possible (p. 839). Ioannou and Serafeim’s second 
reason is also noted by Campbell (2007), which asks why corporations behave in socially 
responsible ways from an institutional perspective. In situations where competition is so 
extremely intense that profit margins are narrow enough to put shareholder value and firm 
survival at risk, Campbell (2007) suggests that the incentive to cut corners and save money will 
cause corporations to act in socially irresponsible ways insofar as they believe that this will help 
them turn a profit and survive. 
In sum, whether CSR makes sense as a differentiation device depends on the institutional 
context and the extent to which resource providers such as consumers and employees appreciate 
CSR2. In developing countries, firms’ environmental performance may not translate into higher 
willingness-to-pay by consumers (or higher willingness-to-supply by employees) as in developed 
                                                          
2. We appreciate the comment from one anonymous reviewer. 
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economies. However, this important distinction has not yet received sufficient attention in 
previous studies3.  
 
Hypothesis development 
    In this research, we define environmental performance as the firms’ curtailment of public 
‘’bads’’ in the form of environmental pollution beyond the level required by the law (Bagnoli and 
Watts, 2003; Besley and Ghatak, 2007). This definition entails that to be environmentally 
responsible firms will incur additional costs in their provision of private goods (Jaffe, et al., 1995). 
We start with a brief discussion of firms’ competitive strategies, which leads to our core 
hypotheses, namely, how market competition may shape a firm’s environmental performance in 
different ways depending on the strategic choice that the firm pursues.   
According to Porter (1985), there are two basic types of competitive advantage: cost 
leadership and differentiation. While it is conceptually straightforward that a cost leadership 
strategy attracts consumers by low prices, such as Walmart’s “everyday low price’’ model, firms 
may “differentiate’’ through various avenues. Two contingent factors are important for the scope 
of differentiation. One is product characteristics. Any product can be viewed as a bundle of 
different characters or attributes (Lancaster, 1966). These attributes can be varied in quantity 
and/or combined in different ways to differentiate a product. Thus, the number of attributes 
inherent in a product creates scope for differentiation. The other factor important for 
differentiation is consumer diversity (Hill, 1988; Sharp and Dawes, 2001). Consumer diversity in 
terms of income, education, aesthetic taste, and social preference creates further scope for 
differentiation even for a relatively homogenous product (Phillips, Chang, and Buzzell, 1983; 
Myers and Harvey, 2001; Foellmi and Zweimuller, 2004).  
 Given that the strategy-performance linkage often generates conflicting results, recent 
developments suggest that aligning strategy with the social environment is important (Li and Li, 
2008). An emphasis on cost leadership is more likely to create superior financial performance for 
                                                          
3 Two recent papers emphasize the importance of time in strategy (Crilly, 2017; Hawn, Chatterji and 
Mitchell, 2018). We would regard this dynamic focus as in line with our perspective here. 
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firms operating in some contexts, such as in emerging economies, because firms gain a comparative 
advantage from their low labor and production costs, and lower price offerings appeal to 
consumers, given their low level of disposable income. Similarly, some studies suggest that most 
firms in China adopt a cost-leadership strategy because the value of differentiation is low (Aulakh, 
Kotabe, and Teegen, 2000; Murray, Kotabe and Zhou, 2005). This is largely driven by the 
consumers’ preference for lower prices and physical attributes/function of products, rather than, 
for example, under what working conditions these products are produced (Lin, 2010).  
Apart from consumer behavior that renders cost leadership a more viable competitive 
advantage, institutional features in developing countries also make it challenging for firms to 
pursue ‘’differentiation’’. For instance, marketing research suggests that developing countries 
have weak intellectual property rights protection, which often jeopardizes the value of ‘’branding’’ 
as a key expression of differentiation. This is both illustrated and complicated by the fact that 
there is a proliferation of counterfeits, replicas, and unbranded products (Strizhakova, Coulter, 
and Price, 2008).  
  More specifically regarding ‘’green’’ differentiation, Orsato (2006) theorizes that a lack of 
reliable information about products’ environmental performance is a major barrier for 
consumer’s willingness to pay, hence dampens corporations’ willingness to “go green”. Berrone, 
et al. (2013) model firms’ engagement in environmental differentiation as largely influenced by 
state-level environmental monitoring, with consumer awareness proxied by the number of 
NGOs, using longitudinal data of 326 publicly traded firms in the U.S. in the period of 1997 to 
2001. Their findings suggest that when the public attention to environmental protection is low, 
firms are less inclined to seek environmental differentiation (p. 905). In a similar vein, 
Jayachandran, et al. (2013) find that although social performance broadly contributes to firms’ 
finance performance, environmental performance in particular does not. More interestingly, in a 
cross-country qualitative study, Bansal and Roth (2000) find that both Japanese and UK firms 
consider environmental initiatives only if they enhance their financial performance; moreover, 
interviewed Japanese firms so strongly conformed to their industry norm at a time when the 
prevailing norm of protecting environment was low that the focal firm would not take a lead 
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because exceeding industry expectations would make it persecuted by their industry peers for 
making them look bad (p. 732). 
  In developing countries such as India, Biswas and Roy (2015) find that consumers are highly 
sensitive to prices, rendering ‘green’ differentiation a risky strategic choice. Chan (1999) studied 
consumers’ green attitudes in China, and concluded that a green strategy would be hard to 
implement successfully when consumers are not concerned about protection of the environment. 
Therefore, we argue that it is important to consider that some firms may not adopt social-
performance-based differentiation when various social, cultural, and institutional factors are not 
strong or stable enough to make it viable. By contrast, a cost-leadership strategy can be an 
effective alternative because it is less dependent on social and institutional infrastructure. This 
strategy can be particularly effective in hyper-competitive environments with a dispersed 
industrial structure, where firms aim to enhance performance and increase market share through 
a low-cost position relative to their rivals. A cost leadership strategy typically requires large-scale 
production, rigorous process improvements, learning by doing, cost control, and cost 
minimization in R&D, advertising, sales, and services (Gao, et al., 2010).  
This leads us to argue that when the overall environment is characterized as cost-oriented and 
hyper-competitive, heightened market competition could have an overarching negative effect on 
firms’ environmental performance. Furthermore, firms explicitly adopting a cost-leadership 
strategy in this type of environment will face greater pressure on their production costs to 
maintain their leadership position. This will constrain them from attaining more desirable 
environmental performance even more than their peers. We sum up the discussion into the 
following two hypotheses: 
H1: An increase in market competition will reduce the environmental performance of all firms operating in a cost-
oriented industrial environment.  
H2: A firm-level cost-leadership strategy will exacerbate the negative impact of market competition on firms’ 
environmental performance in a cost-oriented industrial environment. 
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  By the same logic, price pressure may be less threatening for firms pursuing a differentiation 
strategy. Differentiation is the process of distinguishing a product or service from others (Mercer, 
1992; Dickson, 1997) and making it more attractive to a particular target audience or market 
(Dickson and Ginter, 1987). The objective of differentiation is to develop a position that 
potential customers see as unique, thereby softening price-based competition. There are a variety 
of avenues through which firms may differentiate themselves in the marketplace, for example, 
based on their treatment of workers, such as Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream,4 or on their treatment of 
animals, such as Chipotle,5 or use of natural and organic ingredients, such as Burt’s Bees and 
Patagonia,6 or commitment to clean and sustainable production techniques, such as Starkist, 
Tyson, and Tim’s of Maine,7 or on their technological innovations, such as Apple, GE, and 
Nokia, or customer service, such as Amazon, UPS, and FedEx. In addition, a firm’s focus on 
advertising and other marketing activities may serve either to emphasize these and other objective 
attributes that differentiate it from its competitors or to create subjective differentiating attributes 
that perform the same differentiating function (Buehler and Halbheer, 2011).  
 A ‘differentiation’ strategy will generally soften price-based competition in two 
complementary ways. First, differentiation may create brand loyalty, reducing demand elasticity 
(Baker, 1996; Dickson, 1997). Second, differentiation affects performance through reducing the 
directness of competition: as the products become more different, categorisation becomes more 
difficult and hence there are fewer direct comparisons among rival products (Kotler, et al., 1996; 
Trout, 2000; Sharp and Dawes, 2001). In terms of the classic model of Hotelling (1931), 
differentiation strategies increase the distance of a particular product from its competitors in 
‘’product space’’, making it a more distant substitute for rival products (Salop, 1979). Thus, a 
                                                          
4 Catherine Taibi, ‘’9 Reasons to Love Ben and Jerry’s That Have Nothing to Do with Ice Cream,’ 
Huffington Post, 15 August 2013, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/15/ben-and-jerrys-
love_n_3726083.html (accessed 8 November 2017). 
5 ‘’’Why Chipotle Insists on Humanely Raised Meat,’ Newsweek, May 3, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/why-chipotle-insists-humanely-raised-meat-89691 (accessed 8 November 
2017). 
6 David Gianatasio, ‘Burt’s Bees Tells Two Young Women’s Remarkable Stories of Unique Beauty,’ 
Adweek, May 13, 2016, http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/burts-bees-tells-two-young-
womens-remarkable-stories-unique-beauty-171461 (accessed 8 November 2017). 
7 Willy Blackmore, ‘’A major American meat company is going big with antibiotic-free pork,’’ Takepart, 
February 25, 2016, http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/02/25/tyson-antibiotic-free-pork (accessed 8 
November 2017). 
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successful product differentiation strategy will move the product from competing based primarily 
on price to competing on non-price factors, which should reduce the negative impact of market 
competition on firm environmental performance.  We state the argument as the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: A firm-level differentiation strategy will positively moderate the negative impact of market competition on 
firms’ environmental performance in a cost-oriented industrial environment.    
  Having articulated our main hypotheses, we proceed to discuss our empirical context, 
dataset, and identification strategy.  
 
Empirical Context 
Different from the majority of studies that have examined firms’ social/environmental 
performance in the U.S. or other developed economies, we choose China in the early 2000s as 
our empirical setting for several reasons. First, China represents a vastly different social context 
from countries such as U.S., and yet it is important for us to have more understanding of this 
country given its rising economic and political power. For example, if we consider the 
‘environmental Kuznets curve’ discussion (Grossman and Krueger, 1995), China remains on the 
left side of the curve, indicating that environmental degradation will be likely to continue to 
increase with the economic development before the country’s income level reaches the turning 
point predicted by the theory. In addition, being a former socialist economy, China’s industrial 
transformation since the late 1970s is built upon market-oriented and profit-seeking agenda. Not 
only is the diversion from profit objectives blamed for the inferior performance of and the 
justification for the reform of a large number of state owned enterprises, but also stripping away 
the social objectives of enterprises is ideologically heralded as paramount for efficiency and 
productivity in modern China (Bo, Li and Toolsema, 2009; Lin, 2010). This has led to severe 
environmental problems in China. In addition, the legal system in China does not make it easy to 
protect the natural environment in comparison to that in countries such as the U.S., where the 
strong legal traditions can facilitate the challenge and punishment of violators at the initiative of 
citizens and different stakeholders, raising the costs of non-compliance. By contrast, China’s legal 
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system remains subdued by the undemocratic political system. The state remains the dominant 
stakeholder, and whether or not a certain social issue receives due attention depends largely on 
the state’s economic and political agenda.  
On a more micro level, publicly traded firms in the U.S. are large, resource abundant, and 
technologically advanced, and arguably tend to operate in relatively concentrated industrial 
environments (Chemmanur, He, and Nandy, 2010).8 By contrast, non–listed Chinese 
manufacturing firms are relatively small, more labor-intensive, and more resource-constrained, 
and generally operate in far more dispersed industrial structures. Taking these considerations 
together, it is plausible that Chinese firms’ perception of and engagement in environmental 
performance could be immensely different from that in the U.S., which makes it difficult to 
extrapolate previous findings to this context.  
   Last but not least, while Flammer (2015) suggests that heightened import competition will 
make it harder for U.S. domestic firms to compete with foreign competitors on a ‘cost’ basis, thus 
increase their incentive to engage in CSR-based ‘differentiation’, we argue that it is plausible the 
opposite holds true for Chinese firms given their different comparative advantages. For example, 
Barney and Zhang (2008) argue that ‘Made in China’ stands for low cost and good value. This 
country-based image emerged out of the business level strategies pursued by many Chinese firms, 
namely, a strategy that focused on average quality linked with very low cost manufacturing (Loo 
and Davies, 2006; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The success of these strategies has led China to 
develop the reputation of being the ‘world factory’ (Deloitte Research, 2003). Taking these 
arguments together, our empirical focus on Chinese manufacturing firms justifies the reference to 
a ‘cost oriented industrial environment’ that we have made in our hypotheses.  
 
                                                          
8 For example, between 2000 and 2006, the average three digit HHI index based on the SIC is 0.1519 
among listed US firms that are simultaneously present in the KLD database and Compustat. This is the 
sample used in most CSR studies. In the same period, the average four digit HHI index based on the 
Chinese Industrial Classification of all Chinese manufacturing firms with annual turnover of RMB 5 million 
or above is only 0.0188. Admittedly, these are not directly comparable due to the difference in industry 
classification systems, but it is still evident that the former represents a very different industrial structure 
from the latter. For a recent discussion regarding increasing concentration among US listed firms, see 
Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely (2016).  
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Data Description 
    We use a sample of Chinese firms monitored by the ‘Green Watch’ program in Jiangsu 
Province between 2000 and 2005 to evaluate our hypotheses. Here we outline the background of 
the program and explain the data choice.  
 In 1999, China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) launched its Green 
Watch Program supported by the World Bank’s InfoDev Program. Such public disclosure 
program rates firms’ environmental performance from best to worst in five colors—green, blue, 
yellow, red and black (Wang, et al., 2004), as shown in Appendix 1. The primary benchmarks for 
ratings are China’s emission and discharge standards that specify effluent concentration limits. 
Firms violating any of these standards are rated red (we code it as 2), and firms violating standards 
in more than 60 percent of inspections are rated black (we code it as 1, the worst performance). 
The secondary benchmarks are China’s load-based emission and discharge standards. Firms that 
satisfy the primary benchmarks but violate the secondary standards are rated yellow (we code it as 
3). The rating system also incorporates other performance indicators, such as whether or not the 
firm received public complaints and whether or not the firm had a China Cleaner Production 
certificate and/or an ISO14000 certificate. The system specifies a link between each rating (from 
1 to 5) to one or multiple indicators that determine it. Our coding follows that in previous research, 
such as Jin, Wang, and Wheeler (2010) and Bu, Liu and Gao (2011). 
 The program was extended from Zhenjiang City to all of Jiangsu Province in 2001, and to 
eight other provinces during 2003-2005. Nationwide implementation of Green Watch has been 
promoted since 2005. Our data comes from the ‘Green Watch’ program in Jiangsu Province 
between 2000 and 2005 since it started the earliest in this province. Jiangsu is geographically next 
to the commercial center of mainland China, Shanghai, and is one of the most affluent regions 
in the country. It has thirteen municipal cities and an average GDP per capita of $22,622 (PPP 
adjusted) in 2012, ranking it the richest province in China. We illustrate the location of Jiangsu 
in Appendix 2. A detailed map of Jiangsu with its thirteen cities is presented in Appendix 3. 
Appendix 4 presents the number of firms across the six years, and Appendix 5 presents the two-
digit industrial distribution of the sample. All firms are from the industrial sector. We identify 
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these firms’ financial and ownership data from the Annual Survey of Industries conducted by 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). NBS data have been used in many studies before, 
including Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2011) and Chang and Wu (2014). 
 
Identification Strategy 
  To test our hypotheses, we specify environmental performance (EP) for each firm f, in sector j, in 
year t, in location l as follows:  
EPfjt=a0-a1Competitionjt-1-a2Competitionjt-1*Cost-Leadershipfjt+a3Competitionjt-
1**Differentiationfjt+a4∑controlsft-1 + ηf +dt + dt*φl +ɛft                                                            (I) 
 We include firm fixed effects, ηf, year fixed effects dt, the interaction terms dt and φl (i.e., 
location) to account for possible location-specific time trends, and white noise ɛft. Our central 
interests lie on a1, a2, and a3. We measure ‘competition’ by exploiting variations stemming from a 
quasi-natural experiment in firms’ competitive environment: China’s WTO accession in 
December 2001.9 Under WTO obligations, China’s import tariff (for output) reductions ranged 
between 10 and 75 percent in the period of 2001-2005 (Hu and Liu, 2014; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 
2015). Compared with other developing countries, China agreed to much more significant import 
tariff reductions in negotiating its accession to WTO. We exploit the fact that Chinese firms in 
industries with higher import tariffs for output prior to December 2001 suffered a bigger 
‘competitive shock’ following China’s accession to WTO than firms operating in industries with 
prior lower import tariffs. The exact phase-out process of industries varied, but import tariff rates 
for output converged in 2005 (Naughton, 2007). To avoid potential endogeneity of the phase-
out, we treat all industries equally regardless of their phase-out schedule, and exploit only the level 
of import tariffs before the WTO accession. Therefore, we use average import tariff rates for 
output in 1999 (pre-sample) classified by four digit industries as the measure of the level of 
                                                          
9 While WTO accession has both a ‘competitive’ impact on domestic firms and a ‘market enlargement’ 
effect where exporters tend to benefit from easier access to larger markets, in this study, like much 
previous work in this area, we focus exclusively on the former aspect. 
15/33 
 
exposure of the industry to trade liberalization.10 To account for the fact that many firms have 
multiple products, we then construct firm level import tariff rates in 1999 by using the weights of 
each of the firms’ main products. We construct PostWTO as a dummy that equals ‘1’ between 
2002 and 2005 and equals ‘0’ for 2000 and 2001. Thus, we have the interaction term of 
ImportTariff1999 and PostWTO, and its coefficient a1 captures the competitive effect on EPft.   
     We measure cost-leadership following Gao, et al. (2010), but with one modification. While 
Gao, et al. (2010) measure cost strategy by the ratio of production cost to total sales, with small 
values indicating stronger cost-leadership, we modify this measurement by using ‘total sales - 
production cost’ as the numerator, so that larger values indicate stronger cost-leadership, which will 
allow more straightforward interpretation of our results.11 We expect a2 to be negative to support 
H2. We also followed the Gao, et al. (2010) measure of ‘differentiation’. To be more specific, 
‘differentiation’ is proxied by a firm’s divergence from the typical level of the ratio of advertising 
expense to total sales in its three-digit industry.12 A positive a3 would support H3. Thus, equation 
(I) can be rewritten as follows: 
EPfjt = a0 -a1ImportTariff1999*PostWTO - a2ImportTariff1999*PostWTO*Cost-leadershipfjt + 
a3ImportTariff1999*PostWTO *Differentiationfjt+a4∑controlsft-1 + ηf +dt + dt*φl +ɛft              (II) 
  
In equation (II), ∑controlsft-1 is a vector of one period lagged control variables including firm 
age, size (log assets), product diversity, profitability (return on assets), innovation (value added), 
and debt ratio, based on previous studies of environmental and social performance (e.g., Russo and 
Fouts, 1997; Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2006; Fernández-Kranz and Santaló, 2010; Declerck and 
                                                          
10 Our import tariff (for output) data were obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
database. We use the effective rates of tariff (denoted as AHS [effectively applied tariffs] tariff in the WITS 
system) at the four-digit level under ISIC Rev.3. Since China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) uses its 
own industry classification system, we use a concordance between the NBS system of industry 
classification and the ISIC classification when merging the tariff database with the Chinese firm-level 
database. This method is also used in Hu and Liu (2014). 
 
11 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚{[(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)]∀𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡} ∈ [−1,1] 
12 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚{[(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)]∀𝑖𝑖∈𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡} ∈ [−1,1]  
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M'Zali, 2012; Flammer, 2015; Hawn and Kang, 2015). Among these controls, the literature has 
documented that age tends to be negatively associated with social performance because of 
organizational inertia. Firm size, product diversity, profitability, and innovation are positively 
associated with social performance because stronger financial and innovative ability usually lead to 
stronger social performance and potential economies of scope of social performance over multiple 
products. Debt ratio is often argued to reduce the slack resources the managers may divert for 
social performance, which may lead to a negative association with social performance. We use value 
added as the proxy of firm innovation because R&D information for non-listed Chinese firms is 
highly incomplete. We also control for five types of equity in the firm: state; collective; foreign; 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao (HTM); and individual equity holdings.  
Last but not least, we include two more control variables and their respective interactive terms 
with PostWTO. One is an export dummy. This is to consider the potential market access benefit 
that exporters may have gained due to WTO accession. The second is the import tariff for input. 
We include it to consider that its reduction occurred simultaneously with import tariff reductions 
for output, and firms may benefit from input tariff reductions because of cheaper or higher quality 
inputs. We adopt the methodology used in Hu and Liu (2014) to compute input tariff rates. In this 
method, the input tariff rate of an industry is computed as the weighted average of the output tariff 
rates of its upstream industries. The Chinese input-output table of 2002 was used as the weight 
matrix to construct input tariffs13. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample data. 
The correlation matrix of main variables is presented in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Data Analysis & Results 
Before we present our main results, it is useful to have a look at the trajectory of our dependent 
                                                          
13 Our identification strategy is similar to that used in several previous studies. For example, Griffith (2001) 
uses the same difference-in-difference method to examine how UK firms’ efficiency increased as result of 
the Single Market Program (SMP) implemented across Europe. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) use the 
method to examine how the exogenous increase in competition created by the Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement of 1989 (FTA) influenced the organizational structure of US firms and their use of incentive 
pay.  
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variable: environmental performance from 2000 to 2005. As visualized in Graph 1 in the 
Appendix, we divide firms into two groups: one is those belonging to industries with higher 
import tariff for output in 1999, and the other is those belonging to industries with lower import 
tariff for output in 1999.  Graph 1 shows that both groups have similar movement before 2002, 
the treatment year that we use. But clearly, those in industries with higher import tariff for output 
in 1999 experienced a much larger decline in their environmental performance compared to those 
firms in industries with lower import tariff for output in 1999 after 2002. While this alone does 
not suffice to support our main hypothesis, we proceed to present our main results presented in 
Table 3.  
Table 3 reports coefficients and robust standard errors of all variables included in the 
estimations. The inclusion of firm fixed effects is supported by the results of a Hausman test 
across all estimations, which indicates that the fixed effects model is preferable to the random-
effects model (for example, in Model 1 of Table 3: χ2=80.645, p=0.00002). We cluster our 
standard errors are the industry level considering the tariff movement occurs at this level. We 
also replicate our main results by using clusters at the firm level and at the city level. These results 
can be found in Appendix 6.  
We first discuss our baseline results concerning competition, which is measured by the 
interaction term of PostWTO and ImportTariff1999. It is not statistically different from zero as 
shown in Model (1) where we consider firm and year fixed effects. In Model (2), we add city 
specific time trends, the interaction term of postWTO and ImportTariff1999 becomes statistically 
significant (robust standard error =0.009, p=0.055), with a negative coefficient of 0.019. This can 
be interpreted as for one standard deviation increase in competition, firms’ environmental 
performance drops by 16 percent. On a scale of 1 to 5, this is equivalent to approximately 0.76 
reduction, a magnitude that is economically significant as well. This result is noteworthy because 
it indicates the importance of including location-specific time effects, where some time-varying 
characteristics, such as changes in the cities’ environmental or economic policies, have an 
important impact on the results. We will return to this shortly.  
 (Insert Table 3 here) 
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 In Model (3) we begin to consider the moderation effect of cost leadership and differentiation 
strategies. We find that while the main result of competition remains statistically significant- the 
coefficient is -0.022 and it is statistically significant at 5% level, the interactive term of ‘cost 
leadership’ and competition attains a negative and statistically significant result, supporting the 
second hypothesis. Meanwhile, the interaction term of ‘differentiation’ and competition also 
receives a positive and statistically significant result, supporting our third hypothesis. The model 
has an overall higher explanatory power, indicated in R-squared. We then move to Model (4), 
which includes observations where the environmental performance exceeds the basic regulatory 
requirements, namely, those observations whose environmental performance exceed the value of 
2. This is more in line with the discussion in CSR literature that to be socially responsible, firms 
have to exceed basic regulatory compliance.  The overall results are unchanged from those in 
Model (3). More specifically, our key interest, the coefficient of postWTO and ImportTariff1999 
is -0.042, significant at 1% level.  
In Model (5) we consider firms with continued presence in the sample for six consecutive 
years since 2000. Previous models are based on an unbalanced sample, which may introduce some 
upwards bias: that is, firms with poor environmental performance may drop out the sample while 
those with strong performance remain. The negative coefficient for market competition is now -
0.053, indeed larger than those in previous estimates, and remains statistically significant (robust 
standard error=0.014, p=0.015). This coefficient is equivalent to a 43 percent drop in firms’ 
environmental performance in response to an increase in competition of one standard deviation, 
equivalent to a reduction of approximately 2 in the scale from 1 to 5. In cases where the firm’s 
starting performance was rated at 5, a reduction of 2 would mean that the performance dropped 
to 3, which is basic compliance. But in cases where the firm’s stating performance is lower than 
5, this means that competition reduced its environmental performance to a non-compliance level.  
The main results with respect to competition and its interactive term with cost leadership and 
differentiation are visualized in Graph 3a, to 3c in Appendix.  
  Having obtained the main results, we conducted several robustness checks. First, we provide 
some explorations regarding how city specific trends have affected our main results in Model 2 of Table 
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3. To this end, we evaluate to what extent the city’s status in terms Two Control Zone (TCZ) may have 
some bearings on firms’ environmental performance. The TCZ policy is one of the most important 
policies to tackle air pollution in China, which was initially adopted by the State Council of China in 
1998. 175 prefectures out of 375 across 27 provinces were designated as TCZ locations due to their 
exceeding national mandate thresholds for either acid rain or SO2. The 10th Five-Year Plan (from 2000 
to 2005) then set the reduction target for SO2 by 10% from the 2000 level by 2005 in TCZ locations. 
Therefore, the TCZ status means more stringent regulations. Relating the TCZ policy to firms’ 
response to market competition, we conjecture that it is possible that firms’ environmental performance 
may deteriorate more in TCZ locations because more fierce foreign competition makes it harder for 
firms to afford higher level of clear-up costs required in TCZ locations. It is highly likely when local 
government prioritize local economic development and employment over environmental protection. 
By contrast, firms in non-TCZ face less stringent regulations, which means that they operate in a 
“natural” state with limited policy intervention. Therefore those firms’ environmental performance may 
decline by a smaller margin precisely because of more lax environmental regulations there.  
To test the possibility, we replicate the analysis in Model 2 of Table 3 by including the interactive 
term of TCZ and year to replace the city specific trends. This way we can capture potentially different 
trends across two groups of cities that are in TCZ locations and those are not in. The results are 
presented in Appendix 7. The results that we obtain in Model (1) of Appendix 6 are highly similar to 
those results in Model (2) of Table 3, lending some support for the view that there are some divergent 
trends across the two types of cities that explain firms’ response to intensified competition. More 
specifically, the coefficient is -0.027, which is significant at 1% level. This is quite close to the coefficient 
in Model (2) of Table 3, which is -0.019 and is significant at 5% level. We then extend our analysis by 
including the interactive term of cost leadership and differentiation in Model (2) in Appendix 7. The 
results are qualitatively unchanged from what we obtain in Table 3. Last but not least, we limit our 
sample to those firms that have over-compliance level in their environmental performance in Model 
(3), and those with balanced presence in the sample in Model (4). All our results are highly consistent 
with those in Table 3. This exercise provides some but not necessarily exhaustive insights into the 
sources of city specific time trends.  
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Secondly, we use alterative measurements for cost leadership and differentiation. Specifically, 
we use ratio of the difference of total sales and selling and administrative cost to total sales as 
the alternative proxy for cost leadership. This is derived from Gao, et al. (2010) with a 
modification in the numerator to allow for a more straightforward interpretation. We also use 
new product output as the alternative to the one based on advertising. Note that the information 
of new product output is less complete than that of advertising, which has made our sample 
sizes smaller. The results are reported in Appendix 8, where we replicate the analysis of Table 3 
by using these two alterative proxies. The results are overall consistent with those obtained in 
Table 3. In addition, based on Appendix 8, we then use a dummy variable to indicate firms’ cost 
leadership and differentiation strategy by using sample mean as the cutoff point. The results are 
presented in Appendix 9. The overall results are highly consistent with those when the two 
variables are measured as continuous ones.  
  Third, state-owned-enterprises are arguably less subject to market competition due to political 
intervention; therefore including them in the sample may underestimate the real impact of 
competition on environmental performance. We replicate regressions in Table 3 by limiting our 
sample to firms with less than 50 percent state ownership, and find that our earlier results remain 
unchanged. The results are presented in Appendix 10.  
  Finally, we evaluate how our findings may be related to the ‘pollution haven’ literature, which 
argues that multinational firms can ‘export pollution’ by locating their dirtier operations to 
developing countries with lax environmental standards (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Copeland and Taylor, 
2004; Bu and Wagner, 2016). The empirical support for ‘pollution haven’ remains mixed 
(Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Grether, et al., 2012; Millimet and Roy, 2016), and its vast empirical 
and theoretical literature is beyond the scope of our paper. Our empirical setting is also not well 
equipped to study this hypothesis given that our focus is on changes in ‘competitive pressure’ 
rather than changes in ‘environmental standards’. But it is worthy to evaluate the possibility that 
if industries with high import tariff protections in 1999 also concurrently attracted higher levels 
of FDI in our sample, and firms with foreign equity responded more negatively to competition 
than their domestic counterparts, then our findings would resemble the ‘pollution haven’ notion. 
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Neither speculation is supported in our data. We use a fixed effects model and find that foreign 
equity is not positively associated with “competition’’; nor is foreign equity associated with worse 
environmental performance. The fact that our balanced sub-sample always generates larger 
expected coefficients indicates that it is more of within-firm effect than a between-firm effect 
that we capture.14  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  Solow once characterized a finding of Hotelling as demonstrating that “the monopolist is the 
conservationist’s friend’’ (Solow, 1974; Hotelling, 1929). He was referring specifically to Hotelling’s 
theoretical prediction that a monopolist would deplete a given stock of natural resources more 
slowly than would a competitive firm. We may update this idea by replacing ‘’conservationist’’ with 
“environmentalist’’, and note that the output reduction associated with monopoly can also be 
expected, all else equal, to be accompanied by lower levels not only of resource usage but also of 
the production of negative externalities such as water pollution, air pollution, and global warming. 
Modern strategic analysis goes an important step further than this by incorporating the 
environmental performance of a firm into the framework of corporate strategy. Following Porter, 
we divide the broad strategies chosen by firms into two categories, cost leadership and 
differentiation. We find that apart from an overall negative impact of competition on firms’ 
environmental performance in our sample, a cost-leadership strategy on the part of the firm 
exacerbates this negative impact. By contrast, a differentiation strategy positively moderates the 
negative relationship between competition and environmental performance.  
    We hope that our research makes a first step towards a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between firms’ strategic choices and their environmental performance. We close with some 
reflections on our findings and their implications for further research in this area.  
    First,  although we do not utilize institutional comparisons in our analysis, our results are clearly 
institutions-laden in the sense they cannot be detached from China’s unique economic and 
institutional environment in the early 2000s, when a cost-based leadership strategy remained the 
                                                          
14 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the comment that has led to this discussion.   
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dominant competitive advantage of manufacturing sectors in China, and that may have 
compromised their social performance15. The contrasting results that we obtain in comparison to 
those in Flammer (2015) indicate that more theoretical and empirical work is needed to 
systematically assess to what extent institutional environments such as variations in consumers’ care 
for and willingness to pay for green products, and variations in countries’ regulatory and legislative 
settings, may give arise to divergent competitive advantages which in turn affect corporate social 
performance in different ways. It is only with cross-country comparisons that such cross-country 
differences may be revealed. This is an important future research direction, which should provide a 
more in-depth understanding of how national cultural and institutional environment matters for 
CSR.  
  Our second reflection is on differentiation. It is worth emphasizing that the third hypothesis 
regarding the moderating role of differentiation strategy on firms’ environmental performance is 
a general prediction. It is distinct from the innovation literature in the sense that we argue that so 
long as firms pursue a differentiation strategy, regardless of form or shape, they can reduce the 
sensitivity of their customers to price, and this in turn should mitigate the negative impact of 
competition on firms’ environmental performance. By contrast, technological innovation is the 
‘’differentiation’’ device emphasized in the innovation literature, which analyses the returns of 
this particular strategy in industries that have different distributions in terms of the number of 
firms that are technology leaders versus technology laggards.      
  Our hypothesis does not contradict the key theoretical arguments in the innovation literature. 
First, if we view ‘’environmental strategy’’ as the only differentiation device that firms deploy, 
firms’ response to heightened competition may differ depending on the extent to which they 
adopt their ‘’environmental’’ differentiation strategy ex ante. For example, Fisman, et al. (2006) 
argue that CSR is more likely to occur in highly competitive markets where CSR is the only 
product differentiation device for an otherwise homogenous product. This theoretical argument 
is in line with the ‘’escape’’ competition argument in the innovation literature (Aghion, et al., 
                                                          
15 The institutional context in China may have changed or slowly shifted since 2006, the end of our sample 
period. See relevant discussion in Marquis and Qian (2014). 
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2005), but does not consider the variations of firm distributions in terms of whether they are 
‘environmental’ leaders or laggards, thus ignoring the other prediction (i.e., the Schumpeterian 
effect with respect to rent dissipation) discussed in the same literature.16 If we accept the 
‘’environmental’’ differentiation strategy as one, but not the only, way that firms differentiate 
themselves, then we may find it appropriate to argue that differentiation in general softens the 
negative impact of competition on firms’ environmental performance.  
    As noted earlier, the ability of a firm to utilize product differentiation as a competitive strategy 
depends on the characteristics inherent to the product itself and the heterogeneity of customers.  
Two additional factors seem likely to increase the incidence and importance of a strategy of 
product differentiation going forward. First, and somewhat corresponding to the importance of a 
“hyper-competitive environment” in forcing the adoption of a cost minimization strategy, there 
is arguably a positive income elasticity of consumer taste for product differentiation. Only if 
consumers have a certain level of disposable income can they afford to buy sweatshop-free 
clothing as opposed to the least expensive items on sale.  Thus if the world continues to exhibit 
both the broad increase in average income and the reduction in the incidence of absolute poverty 
that have characterized recent decades, consumers demand for more differentiated products 
should incentivise companies to move from cost minimization to differentiation as a competitive 
strategy.  Our results suggest that such a move will have a positive side effect of environmental 
improvements as a result of increased environmental CSR:  a global move to the right and down 
the environmental Kuznets curve. 
  Second, and related, both global income growth and rapid technological change are likely to lead 
to an increased growth of the services sector in economies around the world, at the (relative) 
expense of both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2009).  The 
Googles and Facebooks of the world, and their inevitable successors, are capital-intensive firms 
without large stocks of physical capital (Haskel and Westlake, 2017), and their billion-dollar 
                                                          
16 For example, Li and Zhou (2017) find that, using US listed firms from 1976 to 2005, import competition 
from high-wage countries increases US firms’ innovation because such competition is viewed as ‘neck-to-
neck’; by contrast, import competition from low-wage countries does not increase US firms’ innovation.  
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revenue streams are accompanied to a large degree by the pollution only from the electricity 
required to power them.  Firms like Google and Facebook mostly offer products that are free to 
consumers, but in neither case is that related to a cost minimization strategy:  for these firms, 
differentiation is all.  Again, to the degree that such firms face increased competition, our results 
suggest that they are likely to seek to increase their CSR, environmental and otherwise. 
  An interesting implication of our results is that, while China’s WTO accession both increased 
competition and likely opened markets for Chinese firms, such a market enlargement effect may 
have a less clearly positive impact on overall Chinese economic welfare than economists would 
otherwise assume.  The interpretation could be that the removal of trade barriers makes the 
competitiveness advantage of China as the world’s factory (i.e., low cost manufacturing coupled 
with less stringent environmental regulations) more salient.  This would be consistent with our 
earlier discussion that China is likely still on the left hand side of the environmental Kuznets 
curve, the side where economic growth leads to a more rather than a less pollution-intensive 
manufacturing sector and living environment.  This emphasizes the importance of government 
policies that alleviate rather than exacerbate the harmful nature of this trade-off, seeking to move 
the country to a range where growth is green rather than brown. 
  Finally, we suggest that more research can look into how corporations adjust their social 
performance when market competition loosens rather than toughens. Are the incentives and 
results that we have discussed here symmetric? Do corporations become more generous in 
allocating investment and resources for social causes when market competition softens? How do 
the competitive strategies chosen by firms increase or moderate tendencies in that direction? The 
current emerging ‘protectionism’ might provide such interesting empirical opportunities.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Measurement Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Environmental performance 1-5, higher values indicate better performance Green Watch Program in Jiangsu China 3.58 0.81 1.00 5.00 
Post WTO Dummy variable; before 2001 is coded as ‘0’, otherwise ‘1’ This study (NBS) 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Import tariff rates for output 1999 Import tariff rates for output in 1999 WITS website 20.29 5.91 6.45 32.47 
Export Dummy variable; exporter is coded as “1”, otherwise “0” This study (NBS) 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Import tariff rates for input 1999 Import tariff rates for input in 1999 WITS website 8.89 3.28 3.94 13.27 
Age Number of years in operation This study (NBS) 13.69 13.88 1.00 109.00 
Log assets Natural log of total assets This study (NBS) 10.65 1.63 3.82 16.87 
Return on assets Return on assets This study (NBS) 0.07 0.10 0.00 4.23 
Product diversity Number of main products This study (NBS) 1.45 0.72 1.00 3.00 
Log value added Natural log of value added This study (NBS) 10.50 0.98 1.60 15.24 
Debt ratio Long term liability/total assets This study (NBS) 0.64 0.25 0.00 3.87 
State equity % State equity/total received capital This study (NBS) 0.06 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Collective equity % Collective capital/total received capital This study (NBS) 0.07 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Foreign equity % Foreign capital/total received capital This study (NBS) 0.13 0.31 0.00 1.00 
HKTM equity % HKTM capital/total received capital This study (NBS) 0.07 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Individual equity %  Individual capital/total received capital This study (NBS) 0.46 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Cost leadership  See endnote 11    This study (NBS) 0.18 0.30 -1.00 1.00 
Differentiation  See endnote 12    This study (NBS) 0.05 0.32 -1.00 1.00 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of main variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Environmental performance 1                  
(2) Post WTO -0.02 1                 
(3) Import tariff rates for output 1999 -0.04 0.02 1                
(4) Export 0.12* -0.06* 0.05* 1               
(5) Import tariff rates for input 1999 0.01 0.02* 0.81* 0.07* 1              
(6) Age -0.03 -0.09* -0.05* 0.10* -0.02 1             
(7) Log assets 0.24* -0.08* -0.07* 0.36* -0.03* 0.19* 1            
(8) Return on assets 0.03 0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.07* -0.11* -0.12* 1           
(9) Product diversity 0.01 -0.04* -0.10* 0.04* -0.12* 0.22* 0.13* -0.05* 1          
(10) Log value added 0.14* 0.01 -0.13* 0.11* -0.15* 0.02 0.37* 0.02 0.01 1         
(11) Debt ratio -0.13* -0.03* -0.07* -0.06* 0.09* 0.13* -0.11* -0.16* 0.04* -0.05* 1        
(12) State equity % 0.02 -0.08* -0.04* 0.06* -0.03 0.32* 0.21* -0.07* 0.14* 0.07* 0.04* 1       
(13) Collective equity % -0.08* -0.05* -0.00 -0.08* -0.02 0.08* -0.07* 0.12 0.02 -0.04* 0.05* -0.08* 1      
(14) Foreign equity % 0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.31* -0.01 -0.15* 0.34* -0.00 -0.07 0.16* -0.22* -0.08* -0.11* 1     
(15) HTM equity % 0.25* 0.00 0.04* 0.14* 0.04* -0.12* 0.113* -0.13* -0.06* 0.06* -0.09* -0.07* -0.07* -0.13* 1    
(16) Individual equity % -0.17* 0.05* 0.06* -0.23* 0.06 -0.03 -0.41* -0.40* -0.03 -0.15* 0.16* -0.25* -0.26* -0.40* -0.28* 1   
(17) Cost leadership -0.12* -0.02* 0.03* -0.21 0.00 -0.08 -0.49 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.18 0.04 0.17* 1  
(18) Differentiation 0.05*       
     
   
  
  
 
0.02* -0.02 0.04* -0.01 0.04* 0.07* 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03* 0.00 -0.03* 0.01 -0.09* 1 
Notes: pairwise correlation. *p<0.01                   
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Table 3: The effect of China’s WTO accession on firms’ environmental performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample Full sample Full sample Over-compliance Balanced panel 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Post WTO 0.181 (0.363) 0.453 (0.011) 0.122 (0.857) 0.217 (0.690) 0.937 (0.015) 
 [0.201] [0.179] [0.672] [0.544] [0.384] 
Import tariff for output 1999 0.006 (0.712) 0.016 (0.564) -0.001(0.989) -0.026 (0.444) 0.049 (0.028) 
 [0.024] [0.029] [0.041] [0.034] [0.022] 
Post WTO*import tariff for output 1999 -0.009 (0.417) -0.019 (0.055) -0.022 (0.041) -0.042 (0.008) -0.053 (0.010) 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.014] 
Post WTO*import tariff for output*Cost leadership   -0.132 (0.054) -0.131 (0.042) -0.148 (0.037) 
   [0.068] [0.057] [0.059] 
Cost leadership   -1.331 (0.269) -1.075 (0.115) -1.159 (0.120) 
   [1.200] [0.791] [0.891] 
Post WTO*cost leadership    1.414 (0.293) 0.895 (0.254) 0.897 (0.221) 
   [1.341] [1.023] [1.021] 
Import tariff for output*cost leadership    0.134 (0.028) 0.134 (0.028) 0.135 (0.020) 
   [0.061] [0.061] [0.058] 
Post WTO*Import tariff for output*differentiation    0.124 (0.004) 0.096 (0.003) 0.097 (0.003) 
   [0.043] [0.035] [0.036] 
Differentiation   0.038 (0.400) 0.041 (0.412) 0.085 (0.276) 
   [0.045] [0.045] [0.095] 
Post WTO*differentiation   -0.056 (0.466) -0.025 (0.431) -0.024 (0.412) 
   [0.077] [0.075] [0.075] 
Import tariff for output*differentiation   0.018 (0.553) 0.021 (0.554) 0.020 (0.555) 
   [0.053] [0.061] [0.059] 
Lagged age 0.002 (0.221) 0.004 (0.270) 0.001 (0.868) -0.002 (0.551) -0.018 (0.230) 
 [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.015] 
Lagged log assets -0.009 (0.756) -0.020 (0.610) -0.056 (0.466) -0.081 (0.172) -0.108 (0.456) 
 [0.033] [0.039] [0.077] [0.059] [0.117] 
Lagged return on assets -0.065 (0.708) -0.388 (0.341) -0.244 (0.604) 0.252 (0.112) -0.394 (0.649) 
 [0.186] [0.408] [0.470] [0.127] [0.866] 
Lagged product diversity 0.028 (0.331) 0.073 (0.270) 0.038 (0.400) 0.019 (0.576) 0.029 (0.190) 
 [0.034] [0.066] [0.045] [0.035] [0.028] 
Lagged value added 0.045 (0.799) 0.050 (0.043) 0.050 (0.041) 0.050 (0.040) 0.095 (0.120) 
 [0.023] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.061] 
Lagged debt ratio -0.054 (0.632) -0.170 (0.345) -0.102 (0.517) -0.238 (0.108) -0.142 (0.442) 
 [0.115] [0.180] [0.184] [0.148] [0.185] 
Lagged state equity % 0.061 (0.508) 0.046 (0.727) 0.092 (0.544) 0.085 (0.462) 0.060 (0.767) 
 [0.094] [0.132] [0.151] [0.115] [0.203] 
Lagged collective equity % -0.030 (0.760) -0.074 (0.616) -0.118 (0.475) -0.128 (0.332) -0.197 (0.340) 
 [0.102] [0.147] [0.165] [0.132] [0.206] 
Lagged foreign equity % 0.082 (0.521) 0.081 (0.669) -0.570 (0.132) -0.323 (0.299) 0.130 (0.633) 
 [0.138] [0.189] [0.378] [0.310] [0.271] 
Lagged HTM equity % 0.070 (0.573) 0.073 (0.554) -0.713 (0.048) -0.446 (0.118) 0.079 (0.742) 
 [0.123] [0.152] [0.360] [0.284] [0.242] 
Lagged individual equity % -0.097 (0.041) -0.250 (0.029) -0.160 (0.154) -0.221 (0.009) -0.056 (0.616) 
 [0.042] [0.114] [0.112] [0.084] [0.111] 
Import tariff for input -0.030 (0.647) -0.213 (0.167) -0.240 (0.050) -0.241 (0.050) -0.165 (0.311) 
 [0.063] [0.147] [0.122] [0.122] [0.163] 
Import tariff for input * Post WTO -0.043 (0.336) -0.045 (0.318) 0.029 (0.746) -0.044 (0.205) -0.115 (0.151) 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.091] [0.035] [0.080] 
Export  -0.184 (0.201) -0.238 (0.108) -0.100 (0.780) -0.086 (0.190) -0.502 (0.046) 
 [0.143] [0.148] [0.359] [0.066] [0.252] 
Export * Post WTO 0.108 (0.464) 0.140 (0.334) 0.298 (0.433) 0.298 (0.412) 0.231 (0.343) 
 [0.147] [0.145] [0.380] [0.376] [0.243] 
Constant     3.361 (0.000) 3.573 (0.000) 3.870 (0.001) 4.169 (0.000) 3.889 (0.001) 
 [0.428] [0.482] [1.144] [1.022] [1.176] 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City*Year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3064 3064 2918 2834 1262 
R2 0.4781 0.4815 0.6089   0.6069 0.6168 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from the regression of firm environmental performance on the interactive term of Post WTO and import tariff 
for output in 1999 and its interactions with cost leadership and differentiation. The dependent variable is environmental performance in 2000-2005.  
Robust standard errors clustered at industry level are in square bracket. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
